Given the many benefits conferred by trait happiness and life satisfaction, a primary goal is to determine how these traits relate to underlying cognitive processes. For example, visual attention acts as a gateway to awareness, raising the question of whether happy and satisfied people attend to (and therefore see) the world differently. Previous work suggests that biases in selective attention are associated with both trait negativity and with positive affect states, but to our knowledge no previous work has explored whether trait happy individuals attend to the world differently. Here, we employed eye tracking as a continuous measure of sustained overt attention during passive viewing of displays containing positive and neutral photographs, to determine whether selective attention to positive scenes is associated with measures of trait happiness and life satisfaction. Both trait measures were significantly correlated with selective attention for positive (vs. neutral) scenes, and this general pattern was robust across several types of positive stimuli (achievement, social, and primary reward), and not due to positive or negative state affect. Such effects were especially prominent during the later phases of sustained viewing. This suggests that people who are happy and satisfied with life may literally see the world in a more positive light, as if through rose-colored glasses. Future work should investigate the causal relationship between such attention biases and one's happiness and life satisfaction.
Seeing the World Through Rose-Colored Glasses: People Who Are Happy And Satisfied With Life Preferentially Attend To Positive Stimuli
People value and seek out happiness, and it is not hard to understand why. Trait happiness confers many benefits: happy people have better coping skills, improved job performance, bolstered immune systems, and greater sociability and likability (Gruber, Mauss & Tamir, 2011; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005) . As a result, we all seek to optimize our levels of happiness, and as psychologists we can contribute to this effort by exploring how happiness is linked to underlying cognitive and perceptual mechanisms. Better understanding such mechanisms may ultimately help us to harness them -both to counter emotional processes that have gone awry and to create lasting trait happiness.
Happiness has been regarded as a global subjective evaluation composed of three parts:
(a) the frequency and intensity of pleasant moods, (b) the infrequency of unpleasant moods; and (c) a cognitive component, which is the evaluation of the degree to which the conditions of one's life are ideal (Diener, 2000; Lyubomirsky, 2001; Veenhoven, 1994) . In the present study, we measure the cognitive component via the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) , and we measure the global assessment of all three components together via the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) . Previous studies have found the SWLS and SHS to be highly correlated (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) , and while we analyze them separately, we use the term "trait happiness" here to encompass both.
Cognitive processes -such as attention, memory, and decision-making -are widely recognized as both contributing to and being affected by positive emotion processes (e.g. Josephson, 1996; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Schwartz, 2000) . In the present paper, we focus on possible links between happiness and underlying mechanisms of one particular cognitive process: visual attention. Happy individuals have been colloquially described as "seeing the world through rose-colored glasses," and the present study seeks to empirically examine whether they are in fact taking in more positive visual information from their environment.
Links Between Attention and Emotion
During nearly every waking moment, the visual system is confronted by far more information than it can hope to process, and so vision is (and must be) intrinsically selective, via the operation of attention. We can attend to many different kinds of stimulation (including our thoughts, emotions, bodily sensations, etc.), but in the visual domain, attention serves to select only some information in the visual field for in-depth processing. This process is capacitylimited, and may often involve a sense of overt effort -though attention may also be automatically captured by certain types of transient stimuli (for a review see Pashler, 1998) . The importance of attention is made especially clear by phenomena such as inattentional blindness, wherein we may completely fail to consciously perceive unattended information at all (for reviews see Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005 ) -with attention essentially serving as a gateway to conscious awareness.
Attentional biases to sensory information have long been recognized as a critical component of emotion (LeDoux, 1986; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002) , and indeed, attentional deployment seems to be a fundamental way in which people shape their emotional experience (John & Gross, 2004; Sheppes & Gross, 2011) . Patterns of attention may predispose people to experience emotions with greater intensity and greater frequency and may even predispose them to negative emotional disorders, such as depression (Gotlib, Krasnopovera, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000) .
Connections between attention and trait negative emotion in both healthy and clinical populations have been firmly established. In subclinical levels of trait negative emotion, high trait-anxious people tend to immediately orient their attention towards threat-related images such as fearful faces (for a review see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007) , while high-dysphoric people preferentially attend to dysphoric stimuli and away from positive stimuli -a bias particularly evident when examining sustained attention over relatively long stimulus durations (i.e. 1 s or more; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011 ; for a review see Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010) . Such attention biases are also found in clinical populations characterized by high trait anxiety (e.g. generalized anxiety disorder; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000) and high dysphoria (e.g. depression; Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988) . Indeed, attentional biases are conceptualized as a central means by which such negative emotions are maintained: increased awareness of threat may lead to higher estimates of vulnerability to it (Weierech, Treat & Hollingworth, 2008) , and failing to attend to positive events may cause dysphoric people to view the world as containing fewer rewards (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012) .
Less is known about possible links between attention and positive emotion, though a handful of studies now suggest a link between attention and positive mood states (and below we discuss in detail how the present investigation expands on these). For example, manipulations that put people in positive moods result in several varieties of enhanced attention to positive stimuli: speeded transient attention to high-arousal rewarding words in a dot probe task (Tamir & Robinson, 2007) ; greater fixation duration on high-arousal rewarding images compared to both neutral and threatening images (Ford, Tamir, Brunyé, Whirer, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2010) ; and heightened awareness of perceptual details for positive stimuli during an attention-demanding HAPPINESS AND ATTENTION 6 task (Becker & Leinenger, 2011) . In addition, some characteristics that are indirectly associated with trait happiness -including optimism, older age, and extraversion -have been linked to attentional biases away from negative (and/or towards positive) stimuli, suggesting that trait happiness itself may also be associated with similar biases (Isaacowitz, 2005; Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006; Segerstrom, 2001) .
The Present Study: Trait Happiness and Sustained Attention to Images
In order to examine the question of whether happy people do in fact take in more positive information from their environment, the present study aims to determine how trait happiness is associated with biases in selective attention to positive images, with a special focus on the timecourse of such associations during sustained attentional engagement. Healthy adults passively viewed multiple positive and neutral photographs (see Figure 1 ) during 15-s trials, while their eye movements were tracked as a continuous measure of sustained overt attention.
The degree to which they attended preferentially to positive images (relating to achievement, social interactions, and primary reward) vs. neutral images was then computed, and correlated with trait happiness -as measured by the SHS and SWLS -after removing variance associated with current positive and negative state affect.
Overall, this study aims to extend past research in four particular ways: First, this is the first study to our knowledge that directly explores links between attention and trait happiness, rather than state positive affect. Trait happiness (encompassing both its affective and cognitive components) seems particularly important to explore, given its consistent association with desirable life outcomes and favorable mental health (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005) .
Should trait happiness, independent of state affect, be associated with looking patterns of the sort measured here, this would provide support for the possibility that attentional biases are linked to long-term happiness -perhaps even as part of a mechanism that could subsequently be harnessed to lead to lasting improvements in daily functioning and relief from clinical disorders characterized by low trait positive emotion. Should such an association not exist, in contrast, this would suggest that attention may be linked only to moment-to-moment fluctuations in state positive affect, without any more lasting connections to sustained happiness at the trait level.
Second, whereas previous studies of attention and state positive mood have typically assessed transient attentional shifts in response to briefly presented stimuli, the present experiments assessed sustained attention across long-duration 15-s intervals, using a continuous eyetracking measure. This allows us to measure not only brief attentional shifts, but also attentional biases that develop and grow in strength over time. Exploring happiness' association with attention over a longer time period may be particularly helpful when examining its associations with emotion, since mood-congruent attentional biases in depression are evident over relatively long stimulus durations rather than early-stage orienting of attention, and it may be important to establish whether attention in happiness unfolds with a similar time course (Gotlib, McLahan, & Katz, 1988; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010) .
Examining the time-course of attention in this way also allows us to distinguish two potential mechanisms that have been shown to be importantly distinct (e.g. Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989) : transient attention (involving individual momentary attentional shifts) vs.
sustained attention (involving selective allocation of resources that persists beyond a single discrete shift of attention from one object or location to another). Whereas many previous studies (e.g. those using the dot-probe task) have explored transient attention, our study allows us to measure sustained attentional allocation, where such an effect might (as explored in the General Discussion) have different implications for the roles that attention might play in the maintenance of happiness over time.
Third, the use of several categories of positive photographs (rather than words, as in some past studies; e.g. Tamir & Robinson, 2007) allows us explore attentional biases to novel stimuli (i.e. photographs that observers have not previously seen), and to explore the degree to which any effects generalize across multiple varieties of positive stimuli. Increasingly, affective science has differentiated between discrete types of positive emotions, such as those related to achievement (Tracy & Robins, 2004) , those that promote social bonding (Oveis, Horburg, & Keltner, 2010) , and those that motivate the appetitive system (Berridge, 1996) . We know that these discrete contexts in which positive emotion may arise facilitate differentiated responses (Shiota, Keltner & John, 2006) , suggesting that research must separately test these different categories before drawing general conclusions about "positive emotion" more broadly. As such, the present study explores whether attentional biases of trait happiness generalize across three distinct kinds of positive stimuli (compared to neutral stimuli), all of which have been distinguished in past research (e.g. Johnson, 2005; Spreckelmeyer, Krach, Kohls, Rademacher, & Imrak, et al., 2009; Wise, 2002) : photographs relating to achievement, social interactions, and primary reward.
Fourth, while using these different categories of photographs, we aimed to control for lower-level stimulus properties to a greater extent than has been done in most previous research.
Patterns of attention may be influenced by high-level semantic content of images, but it is also influenced by low-level stimulus properties -e.g. with greater attention to regions that are brighter, more complex, or have greater contrast (e.g. Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 1998) . As such, we could never be sure if we used only the experimental images whether any differences in looking patterns were driven by the positivity-related content of the images, or by confounded differences in the lower-level visual characteristics of the images (e.g. different average distributions of brightness, or different spatial frequency profiles). To allow us to analyze our data in a way that removes the contribution of such low-level visual features, we also included trials in which the experimental images were phase-scrambled -a manipulation that eliminates the categorical semantic content from the images while preserving contrast, color, and luminance profiles (see Figure 2 ). To foreshadow, and as we anticipated, we observed several differences in fixation patterns across stimulus categories based only on these low-level factors. However, inclusion of these images allowed us to remove the variance that they contributed from our primary analyses -a control that we argue should be adopted in any research of this sort with photographic stimuli in order to ensure that effects are not driven by their low-level visual features.
Method
Participants 70 young adults (53 from Yale University, and 17 from the surrounding New Haven community) participated in exchange for financial compensation. Eight participants from this original sample were excluded -1 for equipment failure, 2 for failing more than one attention check on the self-report questionnaires (e.g. "If you are reading this, mark 'not at all' as your answer"), and 5 for having an unreliable eye tracking signal (defined as less than 80% of eye data being successfully recorded in the viewing area on more than one third of the trials; e.g. Fehd & Seiffert, 2008) . This resulted in a final sample of 62 participants, aged 18-37 (M=22.79; SD=4.00), 40 (64.5%) of whom were women. Self-reported ethnicities were: 31 (50.0%) Caucasian/White, 5 (8.1%) African American/Black, 9 (14.5%) Asian-American/Asian, 9 (14.5%) Latino/Hispanic, and 8 (12.9%) Multiracial. All participants had normal or corrected-tonormal acuity as tested with a Snellen eye chart (Hetherington, 1954) .
Apparatus
Eye gaze was tracked as participants viewed stimuli on a 22", 32 bit, AMD Radeon HD 6630M computer monitor. Participants viewed the display without restraint from a distance of approximately 24" (with all angular extents below calculated based on this distance), so that the display subtended 42.16° (width) by 27.64° (height). Stimuli were presented using Experiment Center software (Version 3.0, SensoMotoric Instruments 2010). Binocular gaze was recorded using a SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI) RED250 eye tracker with a dark pupil tracking system, 250 Hz sampling rate, 0.03° spatial resolution, and gaze position accuracy sharper than 0.4°. All analyses examine data recorded from the left eye. The eye tracker compensated for head movements of up to 25 cm/s, and in the case of more robust head movements, it had a 115 ms recovery time back to full tracking ability after an offset or after the pupil was lost. Tracking was recovered after an eyeblink within 6 ms. Continuous eye movement data were collected using iView X software (Version 2.4.19; SMI, 2009 ).
Stimuli
On each of 12 experimental trials, participants viewed 4 images (each subtending 20.66°
x 11.90°): one neutral image, and three positive images drawn from different categories (one each from Achievement, Social, and Primary categories). Different images were used on each trial, for a total of 48 experimental images. These novel images were compiled for the purposes of this study in order to assess whether attentional biases generalized across several categories of positive stimuli. The images were presented in the four quadrants of the display on a black background (see Figure 1 ), with their nearest borders separated by 4.78° (vertically) and 4.80° (horizontally). For half of the participants, the specific quadrants in which the four images on each trial were presented were randomized and counterbalanced, such that images from each category occurred in each of the four positions equally often. The second half of participants viewed the identical quartets of images, but with the specific quadrant assignments on each trial reversed (such that the particular image that had been in the upper-left quadrant for the first half of the participants was now in the lower-right quadrant). 1 We included four distinct categories of photo stimuli in the present study. The 12 photos in the Achievement category depicted the attainment of goals or rewards -including academic contexts (e.g. graduation ceremonies) and athletic contexts (e.g. winning a race), as well as more generalized depictions of achievement (e.g. podiums, medals). The 12 photos in the Social category depicted positive social interactions such as people laughing together at a coffee shop, or friends hugging. The 12 photos in the Primary category were drawn from a standardized set of high calorie foods (e.g. pizza, pasta, cupcakes) that have been used as primary reward stimuli in previous studies (Giuliani, Calcott, & Berkman, 2013) . Finally, the 12 Neutral photo stimuli were drawn from the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) and depicted a variety of non-emotional scenes, such as shoes on the ground, or a mug on a counter.
To validate these four categories of images on valence and arousal ratings prior to their experimental administration, 150 participants (age 18-75, M=37.51; SD=13.16) were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical-Turk (MTurk; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) .
Participants scored images using the 9-point Self-Assessment Manikin rating scales (from 1 [very unpleasant/very calm] to 9 [very pleasant/very excited]) that have previously been used to validate the IAPS images (Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) . For valence ratings, in paired t test comparisons, each of the 3 categories of positive images was rated as significantly more positive than the Neutral pictures (ps<.01; ds>1.74), but the categories of positive images did not differ from each other (ps>.45; ds<.07). For arousal ratings, as is standard with emotional images (e.g. Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Kellough et al., 2008) , each of the 3 categories of positive images had significantly higher arousal ratings than the Neutral images (ps <.01; ds>.99). Photos from the Achievement and Primary categories did not differ from each in terms of arousal ratings (t(149)=.87, p=.38, d=.06), but both were rated higher than images from the Social category (t(149)=5.40, p <.01, d=.32; t (149)=3.47, p<.001, d=.26).
We also validated the content of the images, by having a separate sample of 120 MTurk participants (age 18-68, M=34.25; SD=12.87) rate the extent to which the positive photos from all three categories portrayed the categories of interest (Achievement, Social, and Primary), using a 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely) scale. Specifically, to obtain an Achievement score, participants were asked: "To what extent does this picture portray themes of achievement (e.g. pursuit or attainment of a goal/reward)?"; to obtain a Social score, participants were asked: "To what extent does this picture portray a positive social interaction?"; and to obtain a Primary score, participants were asked: "How appetizing do you find this photo?" Each image was validated as portraying its category of interest to a significantly greater degree when compared to each of the other three image categories (ps<.02; ds>2.65), thereby validating that the images successfully portrayed the categories of interest (See Table 1 for means and standard deviations).
A phase-scrambled control image was generated for each experimental image using a 2D
Fast Fourier Transform manipulation in MATLAB to randomize its phrase spectrum while maintaining its amplitude spectrum (thus preserving mean contrast, luminance and color distribution, while eliminating semantic content). When presented during the experiment, each phase-scrambled image was always presented in the same position as its experimental counterpart, resulting in a full set of matched control trials. In addition, we included eight filler trials composed of four neutral pictures (mean valence=4.78, SD=0.46; mean arousal=2.69, SD=0.35).
Self-Report Measures
Subjective happiness was assessed using the 4-item Subjective Happiness Scale, which assesses happiness on a global level (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) . Participants responded to statements such as "In general, I consider myself…" on a 7-point scale -e.g. from 1 ("not a very happy person") to 7 ("a very happy person"). The SHS was created in response to the idea that previous scales separate happiness into disparate components (i.e. positive affect, low negative affect, and life satisfaction), whereas people seem capable of assessing their overall trait happiness (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) . SHS scores are correlated with higher selfesteem, optimism, a predominance of positive moods, and with peer informant reports of subjective happiness (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) . A single composite score for subjective happiness is computed by averaging responses to the four items, with final scores ranging from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating greater levels of dispositional happiness. Internal consistency of the SHS in the present study was α=0.90.
Life satisfaction, the cognitive component of happiness, was assessed using the 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) . Participants respond to statements such as "In most ways my life is close to ideal" on a 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 7 ("Strongly agree") scale. SWLS scores are correlated with frequency of positive mood, diminished symptoms of psychopathology, and interviewer estimates of life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985) . Scores range from 5 to 35, with higher scores indicating higher global life satisfaction. Internal consistency of the SWLS in the present study was α = 0.88.
In order to focus on trait happiness, we also collected two baseline measures of state affect (whose contribution to looking patterns could later be partialed out): the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988 ) and the modified Discrete Emotion Scale (mDES; Fredrickson et al., 2003) . 2 Internal consistency of the PANAS (positive affect α = 0.85; negative affect α = 0.84) and the mDES (positive affect α = 0.91; negative affect α = 0.84) in the present study was good.
Procedure
Participants first completed the measures of baseline positive and negative state affect, followed by the picture-viewing task. Participants completed the picture-viewing task in a darkened and sound-attenuated private testing room. They first completed a standard eyetracker calibration task (making sequential eye-movements to several calibration points, until the eye position was recorded within 2° of each point). Participants were told to view the images "as if
[they] were at home watching television" (e.g. Isaacowitz, 2005; Kellough et al., 2008) . They then proceeded to view 32 trials (12 experimental, 12 scrambled, and 8 filler) for 15 s each, in a different randomized order for each participant, each separated by a 2-s display containing only a fixation cross. The picture-viewing task took approximately 10 min to complete, and gaze tracking was re-validated (and re-calibrated, as necessary) halfway through. After completing the picture-viewing task, participants rated the valence and arousal of the images they had just viewed, and then they completed the session by filling out the self-report (SWS and SWLS) questionnaires on a computer.
Data Reduction and Analyses
For eye tracking analyses, the viewing area was defined as the entire display, and the four Areas of Interest (AOIs) on each trial were defined by the boundaries of the four images. 36 trials (4.84% of trials) from the 62 participants included in the analyses were discarded for unreliable eye tracking signals (defined as having less than 80% of eytracking data during that trial being successfully recorded in the viewing area). Dwell Time was defined as the total time spent fixating and making saccades within a given AOI (computed and reported as a percentage of the total trial duration). A fixation was defined as any period for which gaze was still (varying less than 1°) for more than 100 ms. Total Fixation Time was defined as the sum of the time spent fixating within a given AOI across a given trial (again, computed and reported as a percentage of the total trial duration). Fixation Count was defined as the total number of fixations made within a given AOI across the trial. In using these variables as measure of sustained attention, we follow previous attention and emotion researchers (e.g. Kellough et al., 2008; Rösler et al., 2005) . First Fixation, a measure of transient attention, was defined in terms of the location to which a subject first moved their eyes on any given trial (measured in terms of the number of first fixations made to each AOI type, and calculated as a percentage of a subject's total usable trials). (This correlation is in the opposite direction from that usually found -wherein older people tend to look longer at positive images; e.g. Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008 . This may be because our participants were much younger than those in previous studies, which were designed to look at the influence of aging on happiness: in our study, the mean age was relatively young [M = 22.79; SD = 4.00], and our oldest participant was 37.) Because of the significant associations with age and ethnicity, all subsequent correlations between Bias measures and measures of trait happiness were computed both with and without using age and ethnicity as covariates. However, including these as covariates never changed the resulting pattern of significant results, and so the analyses below all report the correlations without including either age or ethnicity as a covariate.
Results

Preliminary
Trait Happiness Measures
Although SHS and SWLS scores were highly correlated (r = .76, p < .001), we explore them separately in the analyses below. SHS scores ranged from 1 -7 (M = 4.76, SD = 1.49) with good internal consistency (α = .90). SWLS scores ranged from 5 to 35 (M = 22.95; SD = 7.73), with good internal consistency (α = .88).
Overall Gaze Preferences and the Utility of Phase Scrambled Control Images
The first step in our primary analyses was to compute the 16 key measurements across all participants: the four Bias scores (Positivity, Achievement, Social, and Primary) computed for each of the four gaze variables (Dwell Time, Total Fixation Time, Fixation Count, and First Fixation). These measures are included in Table 2 , along with the relevant statistics that highlight significant biases, for both the experimental (i.e., intact) images and the phase-scrambled images.
Inspection of these data reveals a common pattern. For the experimental images, several of the Bias scores were significant (as measured with one-sample t tests) for several of the gaze variables. However, many of these effects were also significant for the phase-scrambled images.
As an example, note that the analysis of Dwell Time for experimental images yielded a 4.43%
Positivity Bias, a 3.40% Achievement Bias, and a negative 4.69% Primary Bias -all statistically significant. However, the analysis of Dwell Time for phase-scrambled images also yielded a significant 3.37% Achievement Bias and a significant negative 2.63% Primary Bias.
These patterns suggest that several of the significant Bias effects are due not to the images' semantic content, but instead to their confounded lower-level visual properties. As a result, to characterize the overall gaze measures of interest, we must compute the difference scores between the experimental and phase-scrambled images for each Bias measure, for each participant. Doing so enables us to remove the variance contributed by the low-level visual features so that we can examine baseline gaze preferences of our sample that are driven by semantic content alone. For example, the Positivity Bias for a participant is computed by subtracting their Positivity Bias for phase-scrambled images (itself a difference score, as explained above) from their Positivity Bias for experimental images (another difference score).
Such an analysis is the most direct way to subtract out effects due to the low-level visual properties of the images, so that the calculation of these "difference-of-difference" scores describe the amount of baseline gaze bias driven only by semantic content. For example, if subjects on average looked at experimental (i.e. intact) positive images 8% longer than experimental neutral images, but they also looked at phase-scrambled positive images 8% longer than phase-scrambled neutral images, then a "difference-of-difference" calculation would yield no difference at all -suggesting (in this hypothetical example) that looking was not influenced by the semantic categories of the images..
These difference-of-differences measures -presented in a negative 18.81% Achievement Bias, and a negative 10.48% Primary Bias). Note that these difference-of-difference scores are utilized only to assess these baseline gaze preferences. All of the primary analyses reported below, in contrast, employ difference scores (as described in the Method section), then statistically partial out the variance contributed by the low-level visual features (i.e. as measured in the trials with phase-scrambled images).
How Trait Happiness Relates to Attentional Biases
To test whether looking patterns to positive images differed as a function of trait happiness, we computed correlations between the attentional Bias measures and the self-report measures of subjective happiness and satisfaction with life (as assessed by the SHS and SWLS).
Because we were interested only in the influence of the positivity-related semantic content of the different images categories -and because these turned out to be confounded in various ways with the images' low-level visual properties (as described in the previous section) -all of the analyses in this section were computed as partial correlations that tested the looking behavior on the experimental trials while controlling for looking behavior on the matched control trials with phase-scrambled images. Additionally, because we were interested in the influence of trait happiness -rather than state positive or negative affect -the reported correlations always partialed out the participants' PANAS and mDES scores (both positive affect and negative affect for both measures). score high on trait happiness are no more likely to immediately orient to positive images, even though they do look longer at such images during sustained viewing.
Trait Happiness Influences Sustained Attention, not Transient Attention
To further explore the influence of sustained vs. transient attentional biases with regard to the link between trait happiness and the Positivity Bias, we also separated our three measures of 
Discussion
The present results demonstrate that trait happy people show attentional biases in which they preferentially attend to positive stimuli, such that they may literally observe the world differently -"seeing the world through rose-colored glasses." Participants' eyes were tracked as they viewed three types of positive photographs (Achievement, Social, and Primary) as well as neutral photographs. Higher trait happiness -as indicated by higher scores on the trait happiness and satisfaction with life scales-was associated with an attentional bias towards positive (vs. neutral) images, a bias that was particularly salient during the last third of our 15-s trials.
Revisiting Four Goals
The importance of these results can be emphasized by revisiting the four goals described in the introduction:
Trait Happiness. To our knowledge, these are the first results to suggest a link between trait happiness and biased sustained attention to positive stimuli. And indeed, the associations discovered here were all independent of state positive and negative affect (which was independently measured and partialed out of the key analyses), suggesting that biased attention to positive stimuli is linked to higher global trait happiness independent of the extent to which participants felt positive in the moment. As such, these results are in line with previous studies in which characteristics linked to trait happiness (optimism and older age) are associated with sustained attention towards positive images or away from negative images (e.g. Isaacowitz, 2005; Isaacowitz et al., 2006) .
This link between positive attentional biases and trait happiness has interesting parallels to related clinical findings. Though anxiety has typically been linked to an increased bias for threatening stimuli (Weierich et al., 2008) , recent work has found that, compared to healthy controls, clinically anxious subjects also show a lack of positivity bias (e.g. Chen, Clarke, with our findings, a positivity bias may thus demonstrate a healthy cognitive tendency that underlies happiness and that, when it fails, can facilitate clinical levels of negative emotion.
Sustained Attention. In previous work, positive emotion has also been linked to transient attention. For example, one aspect of trait happiness (positive affect) is associated with transient attentional biases towards positive words in a dot-probe task (Tamir & Robinson, 2007) . Together, these findings suggest the attentional biases in trait happiness are less similar to those that involve transient shifts at stimulus onset (e.g. Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000) , and more similar to those that involve increased engagement across long stimulus durations (e.g. Kellough et al., 2008; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010) . Just as such sustained attentional biases in negative emotions (e.g. in depression or anxiety; see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012 ) may indicate elaborative information processing that also takes the form of rumination (Kellough et al., 2008) and/or intrusive negative thoughts (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 1999) , so too sustained attentional biases in trait happiness may indicate similar but opposite-valence elaborative processes. This finding also suggests that future research on sustained attention and trait happiness should take care to examine attentional processes over relatively long durations in addition to momentary orienting.
Naturalistic Photographs of Multiple Positive Categories. Whereas some previous studies have explored links between attention and positive mood using words, our participants viewed novel naturalistic photographs. Beyond being more similar to some sorts of real-world visual experience, such stimuli allowed us to test several varieties of positive stimuli. In particular, the positivity bias observed here replicated for images related to achievement, social interactions, and primary reward -with none of the biases being stronger for any one positive category compared to the other two positive categories. Although the positivity bias was not driven by attention to one specific type of positive category, examining attention to discrete types of negative stimuli has proved useful in the past (e.g. when contrasting threatening vs. dysphoric stimuli; Kellough et al., 2008) , and so it may still be wise for future studies to assess attention using different discrete types of positive stimuli (e.g. amusement vs. pride) or on different dimensions (e.g. high vs. low arousal), since affective science increasingly draws such distinctions.
Positive Semantic Content vs. Low-Level Visual Features. A final methodological
contribution of these results pertains to the contrast between the raw images (as in Figure 1 ) and their phase-scrambled counterparts (as in Figure 2 ). Though the primary analyses all partialed out the contribution of biases to the phase scrambled images, it seems worth emphasizing that participants did have robust attentional biases based only on the preserved low-level features of those images, when their semantic content was eliminated. Future studies could potentially reveal just which features drive such looking patterns, but even a quick glance at the samples in Figure 2 suggest several possibilities. For example, participants may prefer to view some scrambled images because they are more complex, more colorful, or involve more phaseindependent segmentation. Regardless, these results suggest that future experiments should always take care to test and quantify such effects, since otherwise they could easily misattribute effects to semantic categories that really depend only on confounded low-level visual features.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study was also limited in a few notable ways. First, the use of complex images may yield increased ecological validity and perhaps generalizability, but they also introduce more possible variance in affective responses. For example, an image of a delicious cake might fuel positive thoughts and associations for one person ("Yum!"), but negative thoughts and associations for another person ("My diet is going so poorly!"). Of course, such variance apply to all stimuli to some degree (including words, e.g. 'cake'), but they be especially salient for naturalistic photographs -which can differ from each other along more dimensions than can simpler stimuli such as words.
Second, first fixation data was measured across a relatively small number of trials (12).
Though similar studies have also used this same number of trials (Kellough et al., 2008) , and minimizing the number of trials helps prevent participant fatigue during eye tracking, null results such as the lack of evidence of an association between immediate attentional orienting and trait happiness should be interpreted cautiously, and longer studies might still yield evidence for such effects.
Third, the predictable arrangement of our images (i.e. in 4 quadrants of the screen) may have led to intentional scanning patterns that could mask effects of positive emotional content.
Indeed, several of our participants reported viewing the images in a clockwise manner (e.g.
always looking first at the upper left image, followed by the upper right, lower right, and finally lower left images). Such a scanning pattern might be particularly likely to disrupt the first fixation data, and to push off effects of emotional content into the later phases of the trial, as in Figure 3 . Future studies could address this by jittering the positions of the images on the display.
Fourth, because this study focused on several varieties of positive images, we did not also test for effects of negative images at the same time. As a result, despite the novelty of these results, some of the positivity bias may be due to positivity per se, while some of the bias may simply reflect increased emotional salience relative to neutral images. A straightforward way of testing this, of course, would also contrast positive vs. negative images, correlating the results with measures of trait happiness. At the same time however, note that the present results do rule out other possibilities that would be apparent if we had contrasted only positive vs. negative images. In that case, for example, it is always possible for any effects to reflect either increased attention to positive stimuli per se, or increased distraction away from negative informationwhere these are independent possibilities. Here, in contrast, there were no negative images, and so our results cannot reflect distraction away from negative information.
Underlying Causal Mechanisms
Having established a robust correlation between trait happiness and attentional biases towards positive stimuli, the question remains: how are these two properties causally related?
Does trait happiness drive sustained attentional biases for positive stimuli, or do such biases enhance happiness, or both? The correlational design of this study cannot (by definition) resolve this question, but it is nevertheless interesting to speculate about the possible (non-exclusive)
answers. First, attention to positive stimuli could help maintain trait happiness by enabling the processing of the attended information (Posner, 1978) . In some circumstances, such a process could theoretically foster overly heightened and persistent positive affectivity characteristic of disorders of positive emotion, such as mania (Gruber, 2011) . In particular, biased attention towards positive information could lead to a greater number and relative frequency of positive percepts, which could in turn lead to an impression of the world as a better place -just as attending to many smiling faces at a party (vs. attention to the furniture) could lead to the impression that the party is fun. Similarly, since our interactions with the world are so often based on our percepts, such viewing patterns could increase the likelihood of daily engagement with positive events and rewards -just as attending to a smiling face at a party (vs. a chair) could make it more likely that you will approach that friendly person.
This possibility is consistent with the finding that looking at something more causes one to be more likely to choose it in a preference task (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003) .
Similarly, manipulations of attention towards positive information increase approach motivation and behavior (Goetz, Robinson, & Meier, 2008) , which in the natural world could translate into more frequent pursuit of rewards, and thus more rewarding experiences. Manipulating attention towards positive information has also been found to lead to decreased stress about an upcoming stressful event (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007) , decreased frustration during a difficult task (Taylor, Bomyea, & Amir, 2011) , and higher self-esteem (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007) . These are all cases in which attentional manipulations yield transient affective benefits, but the present results suggest that attentional factors could also yield and maintain happiness at the longer-term trait level, potentially supporting interventions that lead to lasting increases in wellbeing.
Selective attention may also help to generate or maintain trait happiness by regulating emotions. Attentional allocation appears to be a method of emotion regulation that can lead to positive affective outcomes (e.g. Isaacowitz et al., 2008) . Older adults, who are better at regulating their moods (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000) , appear to utilize attentional preferences for positive stimuli in order to regulate their mood (Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008) , and such attentional deployment may contribute to their dispositional positive affect. Indeed, attentional deployment is an emotion regulatory process outlined by Gross (1998) in which attentional processes are recruited to shape affective experience early in the emotion generative process (see also Mauss et al., 2007a Mauss et al., , 2007b . By directing attention to positive stimuli, attentional deployment may then serve as a relatively low-effort automatic regulatory strategy that underlies greater positive affect (e.g. Xing & Isaacowitz, 2006 ) -and perhaps eventually, sustained trait happiness.
If attentional biases towards positive stimuli facilitate trait happiness -just as biases towards threat seem to maintain trait high levels of anxiety (Weierech et al., 2008 ) -this opens the door to attentional retraining in which the goal is to enhance long-term well-being through steering attentional biases towards positive stimuli. Indeed, recent work has found that changing patterns of attention themselves can elicit a resulting change in emotion (for meta-analyses see Beard, Sawyer, & Hofmann, 2012; Hakamata, Lissek, Bar-Haim, Britton, & Fox, 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) , including temporary increases in state positive mood (Grafton, Ang, & MacLeod, 2012; Taylor, Bomyea, & Amir, 2011) . Causal links between attention and trait happiness would suggest possibilities for attention bias modification interventions to lead to long-term increases in wellbeing.
A second possibility is that trait happiness causes mood-congruent or motivationcongruent attentional allocation. Regarding mood-congruency, we know that inducing a positive mood state causes attentional biases towards positive stimuli (Tamir & Robinson, 2007) . And to the extent that one component of happiness is the frequent experience of positive mood states (Diener & Seligman, 2002) , it is therefore plausible that people high on trait happiness are frequently biased towards processing affect-congruent stimuli. Regarding motivationcongruency, increasing the expectation of reward has been found to increase attentional biases to rewarding stimuli (Jones, Hogarth, Christiansen, Rose, & Martinovic et al., 2012) ; thus, happy people's optimism and general expectation that good things will come their way (Seligman, 1991) may cause them to be more vigilant for positive stimuli in the environment.
Beyond these two salient options for the causal directionality of the correlation observed in the present study, there are of course two other generic possibilities. First, both causal directions may be correct: trait happiness may lead to "rose colored glasses" which in turn help to maintain trait happiness. Second, some unknown correlated third factor may be causing both effects without them directly interacting. Given the establishment here of a correlation between trait happiness and positive attentional biases, future studies in this domain may aim to directly ascertain the underlying causal mechanisms -e.g. via attentional retraining. Such tests might help to determine whether this relationship can be experimentally and therapeutically harnessed as a way to create lasting increases in trait happiness. HAPPINESS AND ATTENTION
